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are a people without a historical umbilical cord: as an intelligent 
student said to me last week, "Wasn't it remarkable how President 
Roosevelt finally got us to take on Hitler." Just as every American 
generation thinks sex was invented when it hit puberty, every polit-
ical cohort strongly supports stare if it likes the decisis. American 
law has been politically "seduced" since the memory of man run-
neth not to the contrary. 
THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE. Edited by 
Randy E. Barnett.t Fairfax, Va.: George Mason University 
Press. 1989. Pp. viii, 416. Cloth, $39.50. 
Larry Alexander2 
I 
The ninth amendment is like a mysterious, unopened box only 
(relatively) recently discovered among constitutional artifacts. It 
has not yet been placed on public display because the constitutional 
curators are unsure in which section of the museum to place it. 
Some, the minimalists, believe that it is empty and should be re-
garded as a very minor exhibit in the federal powers wing. Then 
there are the maximalists, those who think the ninth amendment 
box is full and that it belongs in the individual rights wing of the 
museum. Some maximalists (the optimists) think the box is a trea-
sure trove of rights that we should open as soon as possible. Indeed, 
they urge that the box and its contents not be kept in the museum at 
all, but should be put into service to deal with contemporary 
problems. Other maximalists (the pessimists) fear the ninth amend-
ment is a Pandora's box that should in the public interest remain 
closed, despite the constitutional framers' desire that it be opened. 
They are quite content to treat the amendment as a museum piece 
and nothing more. 
Interest in the ninth amendment is perhaps at an all time high. 
Evidence of this is the publication of a major symposium on the 
amendment and the book that is the subject of this review. The 
symposium,J also edited by Professor Barnett, consists of contem-
porary analyses of the ninth amendment. The book, on the other 
hand, is a collection of the major writings on the ninth amendment 
1. Professor of Law, Illinois Instiute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
2. Professor of Law, University of San Diego. 
3. Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.[-]KENT L. REv. 35-268 
(1988). 
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arranged chronologically from Madison's speech to the House of 
Representatives in support of the Bill of Rights to Charles Black's 
mid-1980 s essay. The book and the symposium are nice comple-
ments because the essays in the book are predominantly focused on 
the historical, textual, and analytical evidence of the framers' inten-
tions regarding the ninth amendment, while the contributions to the 
symposium are much more concerned with the contemporary pol-
icy implications of various interpretations of the amendtnent. 
II 
All of the positions that I listed above on the ninth amend-
ment's meaning are represented in the book and in the symposium, 
though the pessimists are somewhat in disguise.4 Disregarding sub-
tle differences among commentators within each camp, here are the 
interpretations in play. 
The minimalists view the ninth amendment as rhetorical only, 
analytically unnecessary and important, if at all, only psychologi-
cally. According to their theory, this amendment was inserted in 
the Bill of Rights to allay two concerns. One concern was that 
adoption of the Bill of Rights would imply that the federal govern-
ment possessed plenary regulatory power except as prohibited by 
the first eight amendments. The other concern was that adoption of 
the Bill of Rights would imply that the Constitution repealed ex in 
propio vigore various rights granted by state law against the states-
in other words, that the Bill of Rights would be read to be exhaus-
tive of all rights, whether against the federal government or against 
the states, state law grants of rights notwithstanding. 
In Barnett's book, the two camps of minimalists are repre-
sented by Raoul Berger (ninth amendment intended to block any 
inference of otherwise unlimited federal powers) and by Russell 
Caplan (ninth amendment intended to block any inference of repeal 
of state-granted rights). (In Barnett's symposium, Michael McCon-
nell also joins the Caplan wing of the minimalists, s a wins that also 
includes Robert Bork). 6 
Each minimalist position faces a major objection. If the ninth 
amendment was intended to block an inference of unlimited federal 
powers from inclusion of the Bill of Rights, then, as most who argue 
against minimalism point out, the tenth amendment was redun-
4. See infra Part IV. 
5. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 CHI.[-]KENT 
L. REv. 89 (1988). 
6. R. BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLmCAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 184-85 (1989). 
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dant. 7 On the other hand, the idea that the ninth amendment was 
intended to negate repeal of rights under state law encounters the 
objection that the inference of such repeal is itself too bizarre to 
have been a motivating factor behind the ninth amendment's inclu-
sion.8 Put differently, any sane interpretation of the Constitution 
plus the Bill of Rights but minus the ninth amendment would leave 
most state-law-based individual rights in place unless and until 
Congress exercised its limited enumerated powers in ways inconsis-
tent with such state laws. 
Most of the remaining contributors to both Barnett's book and 
his symposium are optimistic maximalists who view the ninth 
amendment as constitutionalizing unenumerated moral rights.9 On 
this view, the ninth amendment is neither redundant nor silly. In-
stead it reflects the framers' recognition of the higher moral law 
that the Constitution was meant to instantiate. 
The optimistic maximalists themselves divide into two camps 
depending upon the types of arguments about unenumerated consti-
tutional rights that they believe the ninth amendment makes admis-
sible. The "constructivists" would recognize as ninth amendment 
rights only those that are consistent with or presupposed by the 
enumerated rights and powers.•o In other words, a ninth amend-
ment constructivist would pedigree under that provision, not true 
7. See. e.g., Barnett, Foreword: The Ninth Amendment and Constitutional Legiti-
macy, supra note 3, at 37; Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide Behind the Fourth. and Plead 
the Fifth. But What on Earth Can You Do with the Ninth Amendment'!, id. at 239, 245-46. 
8. See, e.g., Sager, at 243-45. 
9. Amon& these are Barnett, Introduction: James Madison's Ninth Amendment in 
THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEoPLE (R. Barnett ed. 1989); Corwin, The "Higher Law" 
Background of American Constitutional Law, id. at 67; Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution, id. at 93; Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth 
Amendment, id. at 291; Mcintosh, On Reading the Ninth Amendment: A Reply To Raoul 
Berger, id. at 219; Patterson, The Forgotten Ninth Amendment, id. at 107; Redlich, Are These 
"Certain Rights ... Retained By The People'?, id. at 127; and Van Loan, Natural Rights and 
The Ninth Amendment, id. at 149. 
There is an interpretation of the ninth amendment intermediate between minimalism 
and maximalism. According to this interpretation, the amendment constitutionalized as 
against the federal government a closed list of certain specific rights that were recognized by 
the state governments in 1791. In Barnett's book, this interpretation is adopted by Massey as 
part of the meaning of the ninth amendment. Elsewhere, Henry Monaghan has proposed this 
interpretation as perhaps the entire meaning of the amendment. Monaghan, Our Perfect Con-
stitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 367 (1981). Note that this interpretation limits application 
of the ninth amendment to acts of the federal government, whereas the maximalists would 
apply it to the states as well, either through due process incorporation, or, more logically, in 
its own right. 
10. In Barnett's book, Black, Massey, Mcintosh, and Redlich all appear to be construc-
tivist maximalists. Stephen Macedo-Recuons, Rheton"c, and the Ninth Amendment: A Com-
ment on Sanford Levision, 64 CHt.(-]KENT L. REv. 163 (1988)-and Andrzej Rapaczynski-
The Ninth Amendment and the Unwritten Constitution, id. at 177-also appear to be in this 
camp. 
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moral rights, but only those rights that, following Ronald Dwor-
kin,u the interpreter derives from the best political/moral theory 
that would justify the Constitution's text (enumerated rights, pow-
ers, and structure). The "naturalists," on the other band, would 
read the ninth amendment as constitutionalizing any and all moral 
rights we actually have, regardless of their relation to the Constitu-
tion's text.tz 
The constructivists are in theory the more constrained of the 
optimistic maximalists. Some, like John Ely, are in fact quite con-
strained: Ely reads the dominant intention behind the Constitution 
as a whole to be the proceduralist one of establishing a representa-
tive democracy rather than a substantive one presupposing a vision 
of the just society. Ely, therefore, would construct out of the open-
ended provisions like the ninth amendment only such rights as are 
necessary to reinforce representative decisionmaking.t3 Other con-
structivists, such as Ronald Dworkin,t4 Richard Epstein,ts and 
David Richards,t6 find a complete substantive vision presupposed 
by the text and would locate the non textual portion of that vision in 
the open-ended provisions. 
The naturalists, on the other hand, would not restrict ninth 
amendment rights to those that link up with and round out the in-
tentions behind the more specific constitutional rights and powers. 
They would admit any argument that seeks to establish that such 
and such a moral right is one that we actually have, regardless of its 
textual pedigree. The only link the naturalists maintain to the his-
torical Constitution is that the ninth amendment is part of that doc-
ument, and the intention behind it is to constitutionalize our moral 
rights. 
III 
One complication in this taxonomy concerns the possible con-
flict between the rights we actually have-those the naturalist 
would read into the ninth amendment-and the more specific provi-
sions of the Constitution. The constructivists would appear to have 
11. SeeR. DWOllKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE Cbs. 6-7 (1986). 
12. The naturalists in Barnett's book are Barnett himself, Corwin, Patterson, and Van 
Loan. Examples of the naturalist position in the symposium are Barber, The Ninth Amend-
ment: Inkblot or Another Hard Nut to Crack?, supra note 3, at 67; Grey, The Uses of an 
Unwritten Constitution. id. at 211; and Sager, The Ninth Amendment and the Unwritten Con-
stitution, id. at 239. 
13. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
14. R. DWORKIN, supra note 11. 
15. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN (1985). 
16. D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CoNSTITUTION (1986). 
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no difficulty here since their ninth amendment is supposedly con-
structed out of the rest of the Constitution. The naturalists, how-
ever, need some account of how to resolve conflicts between the 
unwritten higher law and the written text that refers to it.'' 
This point leads to a more general point about the maximalists' 
ninth amendment, which is that it provides a very good lens 
through which to view the central jurisprudential problem, the rela-
tion of "reason" and "will" in law generally and in constitutional 
law in particular.ts Put briefly, when we promulgate constitutions 
and laws, we seek to instantiate the moral rights we really have and 
the design of governmental structures and powers that is most con-
ducive to bringing out (really) just, good, and wise government. In 
short, we attempt to follow reason. On the other hand, because we 
are fallible, any decision we actually reach on these matters-the 
constitutions and laws we actually will-may, from another's (or 
our later selves') perspective, conflict with reason. From that per-
spective, our reason and our will are opposed. Yet, to complete this 
picture, our reason also tells us that, fallible though we are, we must 
decide things with some finality, that is, "will" some results that 
will be effectively final over a range of cases, even though what we 
will may not be what reason would later tell us we should have 
willed. 
It is this complex relationship between reason and will that lies 
at the heart of the general jurisprudential disputes between positiv-
ism and natural law, between narrow interpretivism and broad in-
terpretivism/noninterpretivism, and between process orientations 
and outcomes orientations. In fact, all these disputes are just differ-
ent angles on the one big battle between will and reason. Will and 
reason are complements-will detached from reason is tyrannical, 
and reason without will is anarchical-but they are also, given 
human fallibility, always potentially opposed to one another. 
The maximalists' ninth amendment offers the illusion of a way 
to overcome the opposition of will and reason. For according to the 
maximalists, the ninth amendment represents a willing that judges 
be guided by nothing but their reason in ascertaining our rights, an 
interpretivist basis for engaging in noninterpretive judicial review. 
17. Their best bet would be to interpret the "incorrect" parts of the written text as a set 
of narrow rules that are to be followed within their limited domain rather than as broad but 
incorrect principles. See Alexander, The Constitution as Law, 6 CoNST. CoMM. 103, 113 
(1989); Alexander, Striking Back at the Empire: A Brief Survey of Problems in Dworkin's 
Theory of Law, 6 LAW AND PHIL. 419, 432-34 (1987); Alexander, Modern Equal Protection 
Theones.· A Metatheoretica/ Taxonomy and Critique, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 14-16 (1981). 
18. See Alexander, Essay: Of Two Minds About Law and Minds (forthcoming MICH. L. 
REv., 1990); Alexander, The Constitution as Law, supra note 17. 
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Indeed, argue the maximalists, if we really want to be interpre-
tivists, then paradoxically we should be noninterpretivists, at least 
about rights, since interpreting what the framers willed in the ninth 
amendment yields that result.I9 Surely the ninth amendment repre-
sents the best of all jurisprudential worlds, reason and will, sub-
stance and procedure, noninterpretivism and interpretivism, all 
brought together in harmony. 
Of course, this really is just an illusion. The central problems 
of jurisprudence cannot be legislated away by the ninth amendment 
or by anything else. It is easy enough to see that the naturalists 
can't avoid these problems. For what if we accept their invitation 
to constitutionalize through the ninth amendment the moral rights 
we actually have. Not only will we have to decide what to do in 
case our actual moral rights under the ninth amendment tum out to 
conflict with other parts of the constitutional text, but we will also 
have to face the possibility that the moral rights we actually have 
include the right not to have decisions about our rights made by an 
unelected judiciary untethered to a written text. Just as the maxi-
malists argue that the ninth amendment is a narrow interpretivist 
warrant for engaging in broad interpretivism or noninterpretivism, 
engaging in the latter may lead us back to narrow interpretivism. 
To avoid infinite looping, we will have to reject the authority of the 
ninth amendment, in essence excise it from the Constitution. Radi-
cal surgery to be sure, but inevitable if the rights we actually have 
include the right not to be governed by judges. 
The constructivist maximalists appear to avoid the problem of 
having moral rights conflict with their noninterpretive imposition 
by judges because they view ninth amendment rights as constructed 
from the other rights, powers, and structures found in the text. But 
except for Ely's version of constructivism, which sees almost all of 
the Constitution as reflecting a specific procedural concern, most 
constructivist theories tum out to be indistinguishable from natural-
ist ones. Constructivism that would extend textual mistakes by 
building an entire, judicially-enforceable political/moral theory out 
of the text is bizarre. After all, the political/moral theory so con-
structed is by hypothesis an incorrect one. Moreover, the reasons to 
advert to a text-to provide certainty, separate powers, and monitor 
decisionmakers--don't apply to the way that broad constructivists 
treat the text and the intentions behind it. Constructivism of this 
type no more serves these rule of law values than does unbridled 
naturalism. Therefore, constructivism that builds on the text, mis-
takes and all, has neither the rule of law virtues associated with will 
19. See Sager, supra note 7, at 254-61. 
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nor the virtue of correctness associated with reason.zo 
This is why broad constructivists usually tum out to be natu-
ralists in thin disguise. They either interpret the text at such a high 
level of generality that will and reason merge ("the framers willed 
whatever reason dictates"), or they find presupposed in the framers' 
narrower intentions a political/moral theory that just so happens to 
be the one the constructivists would recommend on grounds of rea-
son alone. Surely one can justifiably suspect that the Lockean or 
Rawlsian visions of the constitutional order favored by construc-
tivists Epstein, Dworkin, and Richards are favored because they are 
viewed as correct and not because they are the best ways to construe 
the historical framers' enterprise. The constitutional text and inten-
tions behind it seem to be makeweights in the constructivists' 
recommendations. 
If this is correct, then there really isn't a dime's worth of differ-
ence between naturalism and broad constructivism as maximalist 
approaches to the ninth amendment. The basic problem of natural-
ism-that one plausible right we have is the right not to be ruled by 
unelected judges unbound by a text-is applicable as well to con-
structivism. I might also add that Barnett's own version of the nat-
uralist approach, which he sets forth in the Introduction to the 
book, is aftlicted by the same problems that aftlict naturalism gener-
ally. His approach would have courts indulge a presumption in 
favor of common law liberties, a presumption that could be over-
come by demonstrating a compelling governmental interest. In my 
experience, tests framed in terms of presumptions, levels of scru-
tiny, degrees of compellingness of governmental interests, etc., are 
empty and therefore totally manipulable in the absence of a back-
ground politicaVmoral theory. And when one has in hand such a 
theory through which these tests might be fleshed out, the theory 
ends up doing all the real work, as it should. 
IV 
I have not yet mentioned any ninth amendment maximalists 
who are also pessimists, who view the ninth amendment as an invi-
tation from the framers to constitutionalize unwritten rights that we 
must decline because of our own moral convictions. One reason I 
have not mentioned any pessimists is that I haven't found any clear 
examplars of the breed in Barnett's book, his symposium, or else-
20. See Alexander, Striking Back at the Empire: A Brief Survey of Problems in Dwor-
kin's Theory of Law, supra note 17, at 430-31. 
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where for that matter.21 On the other hand, I think that Ely's nar-
row, process-focused constructivism is motivated in large part, not 
by Ely's reading of the ninth amendment framers' intentions, but by 
his abhorrence of a judiciary given free reign to block the popular 
will by appeal to unwritten rights.22 Similarly, Michael McCon-
nell's contribution to Barnett's symposium, while it adopts a mini-
malist interpretation of the amendment, seems all too clearly to be 
driven by the same concem.23 For them, better to take our chances 
with majoritarian mistakes about our moral rights than with judi-
cial ones. More strongly, for them perhaps one of our moral rights 
is a right against judicial imposition of specific rights that lack a 
textual basis. If the ninth amendment was intended to legitimize 
such judicial imposition, then, on the basis of proper preconstitu-
tional norms,24 those that tell us why and to what extent the Consti-
tution is authoritative and what interpretive methodology we 
should apply to it, we should reject the constitutional authority of 
the ninth amendment. 
If we were to adopt the pessimists' approach and ignore the 
ninth amendment, it would not be the first constitutional provision 
to meet such a fate. For example, the Supreme Court has made the 
fourteenth amendment's privileges and immunities clause into a 
dead letter,2s though its probable intended function has been taken 
over by the due process clause. But no other constitutional provi-
sion has been ignored on the explicit ground that it leads to im-
moral results. (There are, however, some decisions-B/aisde/1,26 for 
example-that might be characterized as implicit rejections of the 
Constitution on moral grounds.) 
v 
The ninth amendment is surely worth thinking about seriously, 
and Barnett's book and his symposium are the best and really the 
only places to begin. But if minimalism is an untenable interpreta-
tion of the amendment, we are left with maximalism and are there-
fore in the middle of all the big questions of constiutional 
jurisprudence. And nothing we can learn about the ninth amend-
ment will help us there. 
21. John Ely accuses Justice Black of being a pessimist. ELY, The Ninth Amendment in 
THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 179, 185-86 (R. Barnett ed. 1989), at 185-86. 
22. See generally J. ELY, supra note 13, ch. 3. 
23. McConnell, supra note 5, at 100-09. 
24. See Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (1981). 
25. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
26. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
